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Pathways from and Crises after Communism:
the Case of Central Eastern Europe
Abstract The transition from socialist redistributive economy to capitalist markets has proved to be a 
rockier road that anticipated. The degree and character of difficulties that the countries faced during the 
transition depended on the nature of the pathways taken.
In this paper I distinguish three major trajectories various countries followed: Central European 
neo-liberalism; post USSR neo-patrimonial regime and the East Asian (Chinese and Vietnamese) trans-
formation from below. Rather than distinguishing the “right way” from the “wrong way” I explore what 
the different costs and benefits of the various pathways were at various stages of the transformation.
Keywords regimes, neo-liberal transition, recession, recovery
Neo-liberal Regimes
The first trajectory follows rather closely the neo-liberal economic prescriptions and was 
mainly adopted by the former non-Soviet European socialist countries. The neo-liberal model of 
transition implied (i) a market-consistent privatization of the corporate sector, (ii) far reaching 
deregulation of all aspects of economic life, (iii) the dismantling of the prematurely born welfare 
state and a (iv) western style, multi-party, competitive political system. 
Each pathway I describe in this paper is an ideal type. There are substantial over-time and 
cross-country variations and there are historic and geographic differences even within each 
trajectory. So there are many shades and phases within neo-liberalism: Poland is quite different 
from Hungary, the Czech Republic from Slovakia. The most unusual case of neo-liberalism is 
Slovenia – it followed, at least initially, a more gradualist approach, especially in terms of pri-
vatization (Peternelj 2005; Šušteršič 2004). It opened up to international capital much slower 
than the other Central European countries, while state owned enterprises were downsized which 
led to a sharp drop in employment, many firms remained in the possession of their management 
and workers. Nevertheless, the similarities among the East Central European countries in terms 
of their transformational trajectory are more pronounced than their differences, if we contrast 
them with alternative post-communist regimes1. If we used the criteria above, the Baltic States 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) would also qualify to be neo-liberal, but for historic reasons 
(their long incorporation into the USSR and short history of independence), their story is quite 
 1 Usually 7 countries are labeled this way: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Romania. I present data from all of these countries.
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different, so they are left out from this paper. I also exclude from the current analysis the Western 
Balkan countries torn by the war (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania). 
They seem to shift slowly, but steadily from the neo-patrimonial to a neo-liberal order, but are 
not quite there yet by the end of the second decade of transition.
On the neo-liberal trajectory, countries faced the challenges of five socio-economic crises: 
1/Due to the shocks of fast deregulation and privatization in the first transitional crisis the GDP 
dropped by some 20% and it took several years before it recovered between 1995 and 20002; 2/ 
Mass privatization combined with deindustrialization led to a sharp decline in labour market 
participation, reducing it to 50-60%. Labour market participation did not recover even after 
economies began to grow by the second half of the 1990s; 3/ During the early 21st century the 
neo-liberal transitional countries faced the second crisis of transition: cutbacks and structural 
reforms of the welfare provisions met political resistance, austerity measures slowed growth, 
increased national debt and budget deficits; 4/ While these countries were still struggling with 
the second transitional crisis, they were already hit by the global financial crisis. This crisis hit 
the region particularly strongly, since it had become particularly dependent on international 
capital; 5/ Finally, as the world was digging itself out of the global financial crisis the former 
socialist countries of Europe became exposed to the crisis of the European periphery, the 
euro-crisis. I call the first and third crisis as “transitional”, since they are specifically related to 
the transformation from redistributive economies to markets, the other three crises are global 
phenomena from which the post-communist societies were not isolated, but could have been 
hit even harder than other economies. 
The first two crises came during the early stages of the transition - the last three occurred 
close to each other by the mid or second half of the second decade.3
The First Phase of Neo-liberal Transition (1989–1998): Recession and Recovery
The first phase of neo-liberal transformation can be characterized by a sharp initial drop 
in the economic output which reached the pre-transition levels during the mid to the late 1990s. 
First I try to establish the common trends in the whole region and next I will comment briefly 
on the cross-national differences.
The Big Picture is pretty clear. While commentators anticipated that the transition from 
redistribution to market economy would have its costs, the costs in real life were far greater than 
predicted by theory. The drop in GDP was about 20 percent for the Central European neo-liberal 
regimes (it was even greater in the Baltic States – there it was close to 50 percent – Dragutinovic-
Mitrovic and Ivancev, 2010, p.5; EBRD, 2010, p. 58). The economy started to drop in 1990. It 
bottomed out in 1994 and recovered to the 1989 levels by 2000. Ladányi is correct: this sharp 
downturn (its extent was similar to the Great Depression of 1929-1933) was driven by two forces: 
market transition/privatization and deindustrialization.
As Kornai pointed out the socialist redistributive economy was an economy of shortage 
 2 Again Slovenia is an exception, it  was already on a growth trajectory by 2003 and its transformational reces-
sion was the most modest.
 3 I follow János Ladányi (2012) in distinguishing the various post-communist crises. János Kornai wrote for 
the first time about “transitional recession” (1994). Ladányi identified four crises after the fall of communism 
in Eastern Europe: the transitional recession was aggravated by the crisis of deindustrialization during the 
early 1990s. The third crisis took place as transitional economies tried to adapt their welfare system to the 
logic of the market economy which overlapped in part with the global financial crisis. In this paper I add a 
fifth crisis, namely the crisis of the European periphery.
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(Kornai, 1980). In Central Europe, there was an economy of shortage also in terms of labour: the 
state owned firms with their soft budget constraint had an insatiable hunger for labour (the story 
in some parts of Russia and China was different – caused by geographic isolation and overpopu-
lation). Hence, transition to markets, privatization of firms and hardening of budget constraints 
dramatically reduced the demand for labour. This was particularly dramatic in agriculture. As 
the collective farms were turned into privately owned (or at least privately managed) businesses, 
former coop members lost their jobs and income opportunities and the emergent (usually quite 
large) farms operated with a fraction of the labour the coops used. But the trend was similar in 
other sectors of the economy as well.
Nevertheless, the demand for labour was also reduced due to the restructuring of the 
composition of the economy by sectors. Socialism was a strategy of accelerated industrializa-
tion, which often followed the patterns of the 19th century economy. While the earlier excessive 
emphasis on heavy industry (until the 1960s the stated aim of socialism was to create “countries 
of steel and coal”) was moderated during the last decades of socialism, “Department I” – the 
production of the means of production: to use the Soviet Marxist terminology - was still over-
grown, it survived only in a COMECON economy, but was not competitive in capitalist global 
markets. Deindustrialization what hit so badly Western – especially the US – economy during 
the 1950s and 1960s came with an even greater vengeance to Central Europe (and to the former 
USSR – but NOT to China, as I will argue later on).
The bottom line: 20-30 percent of the jobs disappeared in the neo-liberal trajectory to market 
economy. The unemployment rate is a poor measure of the problem, it peaks 4-19 percent in 1994, 
but the proportion of those who were employed before the fall of communism and were left out 
or forced out of work after communism had collapsed is certainly substantially higher. Some 
quit jobs “voluntarily” (higher class women for instance who needed employment for the second 
income during socialism, but had much better paid husbands in the market economy, may have 
decided not to seek employment in a market economy etc). “Excessive” employment in socialist 
economies – in all social classes- was indeed driven by low earnings and the necessity for most 
members of the households to earn an income. But many who lost their jobs involuntarily and 
had no realistic chance to obtain gainful employment again, hence stopped trying, took early 
retirement, collected disability pension, survive on the underground economy and therefore do 
not appear on unemployment statistics.
Several countries transferred the “post-communist labour surplus” into the retirement 
system4. The retirement system was already poorly constructed under socialism (it was not an 
endowed system, de facto it was a pay-as-you-go system) which in a rapidly ageing population 
- most of the late socialist countries had low fertility and an aging population - was already 
unsustainable. But post-communist policies with this “transfer of the labour surplus into retire-
ment” scheme aggravated the already unfolding retirement crisis. Such an overloading of the 
pension system created the impression that post-communist economies inherited an overgrown, 
prematurely born welfare system and the task was to cut back the “excessive” welfare expenditures 
(and this created the “third” crisis of post-communist neo-liberalism which will be discussed 
later) when the social need was for an expansion of welfare provisions (already neglected under 
socialism). A better measure of the labour market condition is therefore the labour force par-
 4 This was particularly true in Hungary, less so in the Czech Republic or Poland, see Tryggvi Thor Herbertsson 
and Mike Orszag, 2003, p.11. Average cost of early retirement was about 9% of the potential GDP, in Hungary 
it was close to 20%
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ticipation rate. In this paper I am using the World Bank labour force participation rate, which 
is the economically active proportion of the total population aged 15+ (OECD uses a different 
indicator: % of the economically active population aged 15-64). I present data from four out 
of the seven countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) where there was a substantial 
drop in labour force participation rate: 5-7 seven points in just ten years, 1989-1998. Slovenia 
is an outlier: labour force participation dropped sharply in this country during the early years 
of the transition to 53%, but by 1994 labour force participation stabilized around a respectable 
58-60 percent. I could not find systematic comparative data on labour force participation rates 
in the socialist epoch in these countries, but those rates are likely to be 20-30% higher even as 
late as 1980.5
This sharp drop in labour force participation is to some extent attributable to the disap-
pearance of industrial jobs (for instance in steel and construction industry, mining, agriculture). 
People, especially men in their late 40s or 50s not only lost their previously well-paid jobs, but 
became permanently unemployed, since they could not transfer or covert their earlier skills into 
useable ones in a post-industrial capitalist economy.
This dual crisis – market transition/privatization and deindustrialization – through the 
mechanism of job destruction - had devastating consequences for the health conditions of the 
population and for poverty rates. With the exception of the Czech Republic, life expectancy 
declined during the first years of the transition and mortality increased especially among mid-
dle aged men. Unlike in neo-patrimonial regimes where this proved to be one of the worst and 
lasting disaster in demographic history (Stuckler, King and McKee, 2009, p. 4) in neo-liberal 
regimes there was only a moderate mortality adjustment and the mortality trends already re-
versed by the second half of the 1990s, late 1990s.
The first decade of transition in these regimes was also accompanied by a jump in poverty 
rates. According to EBRD estimates, the proportion of the population under the poverty line 
increased almost tenfold in the region between 1989 and 1998 (from 1.4 to 12 percent, EBRD, 
2000, p.16), though it was stabilized by the mind 1990s.
In 2000, I collected data with the only retrospective data on poverty going back to 1988 
and my findings were similar. Only 1.8% of Bulgarians who were already at least 14 years old in 
1988 remembered to have lived in extreme poverty, this jumped to 16.3 % by 2000. The same 
figures for the other countries: Hungary from 2.5 to 6.8; Poland from 3.1 to 6.2; Romania from 
5.1 to 16.3; in Slovakia from 1.1 to 5.0 (Kligman and Szelenyi, 2002)
The neo-liberal transition to capitalism also led to substantial increases in social inequali-
ties (from the high 10s, low 20s to the mid/high 20s6, low 30s), though in comparison with other 
pathways from communism the increases in inequalities in general were modest and the Central 
European countries remained among the more egalitarian systems.
Although the social and economic performance of neo-liberal regimes were disappointing, 
the social and economic costs of the transition was far worse than predicted even by the more 
pessimistic economists; in comparison with the neo-patrimonial regimes, the first decade of 
neo-liberalism is an undisputable success story. The decline of the economy was less steep, the 
recovery faster (within a decade they reached the pre-transitional levels), poverty was not as 
 5  This are the estimates of for Hungary by Maria Augusztinovics, 2005, pp.435-435 and these are consistent 
with data presented by Kolosi and Robert, 2004, p. 49 and data from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 
1997, p. 17
 6 Poland is an outlier with GINI in the 30s
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widespread and deep and most countries under this regime remained reasonably egalitarian. 
Neo-liberalism does not fare that well when compared with “transformation from below” - there 
the only advantage that Central European neo-liberalism has over China – and this advantage 
is not trivial – is political. The Central European countries by the end of their first decade were 
all liberal democracies, their system may not have been as liberal, as democratic and as stable 
as one would have hoped for during the glorious month of 1989. 
Bulgaria7
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
1 -9 -12 -7 -2 2 3 -10 -6 4
Unemployment rate
Na 2 10 15 16 19 14 13 15 16
Labor force participation rate8
Na 59 58 58 57 56 55 55 54 54
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na Na 185 166 172 183 115 319 105 80
GINI9
23.4 Na Na 30.7 Na 24.3 31.0 Na 26.4 Na
Life expectancy at birth10
71.7 71.6 71.6 71.5 71.4 71.2 71.1 70.9 70.4 71.1
Czech Republic11
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
1 -1 -12 -1 0 2 6 4 -1 -1
Unemployment rate
Na 1 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 6
Labor force participation rate12
Na 61 61 62 62 62 61 61 61 61
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na 19 18 14 12 12 13
GINI13
19.414 Na Na Na 26.6 Na Na 25.8 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth15
71.7 71.4 71.9 72.3 72.8 73.0 73.1 73.7 73.8 74.5
 7 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 8 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 9 Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 10 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 11 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 12 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 13 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 14 1988
 15 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
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Hungary16
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
1 -4 -12 -3 -1 3 2 1 5 5
Unemployment rate
1 1 8 9 12 11 10 10 9 8
Labor force participation rate17
Na 55 54 55 52 51 49 49 48 48
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na 8.6 Na Na Na Na Na
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na 75 79 90 86 84 72 64 62
GINI18
21.019 Na Na Na 27.9 Na Na Na Na 24.9
Life expectancy at birth20
69.5 69.3 69.4 69.1 69.1 69.5 69.8 70.3 70.7 70.6
Poland21
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
0 -12 -7 3 4 5 7 6 7 5
Unemployment rate
Na 7 12 14 16 16 15 13 10 10
Labor force participation rate22
Na 63 62 61 61 60 59 58 57 57
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na 23.8 Na Na Na Na Na
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na 95 82 87 89 72 50 44 44 39
GINI23
26.9 Na Na 26.7 32.3 Na Na 32.7 Na 32.9
Life expectancy at birth24
71.0 70.9 70.6 71.1 71.6 71.7 71.9 72.3 72.7 73.0
Romania25
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
-6 -6 -13 -9 2 4 7 4 -6 -5
Unemployment rate
Na Na 3 8 10 11 10 7 6
Labor force participation rate26
Na 59 60 60 61 62 63 64 66 65
Population below poverty line27
Na Na Na Na Na 21.5 Na Na Na Na
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na Na Na 21 28 16 18
GINI28
23.2 Na na 25.5 Na 28.2 Na Na Na 29.4
Life expectancy at birth29
69.5 69.7 69.8 69.8 69.6 69.5 69.5 69.1 69.0 69.8
 16 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 17 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 18 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 19 1987 
 20 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 21  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
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Slovakia30
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
1 0 -16 -7 -4 6 6 6 5 4
Unemployment rate
Na 1 10 10 14 14 13 11 12 13
Labor force participation rate31
Na 66 66 65 63 60 60 60 60 60
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na 28 25 22 32 34 35
GINI32
19.533 Na Na 19.5 Na Na Na 25.8 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth34
1.0 70.9 70.9 71.8 72.5 72.3 72.3 72.7 72.7 72.6
Slovenia35
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
Na na -8.9 -5.5 2.9 5.3 3.6 3.6 4.9 3.5
Unemployment rate
Na na 7.1 na 8.7 8.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.6
Labor force participation rate36
Na 53 53 53 53 58 59 58 58 59
Population below poverty line37
Na na na na 13.6 Na na 14.9 na na
Public debt(% of GDP)
Na na na Na 21.1 18.5 16.9 20.3 20.9 21.5
GINI38
23.639 na na Na 29.2 Na na Na na 28.4
Life expectancy at birth40
72.7 73.2 73.4 73.3 73.3 73.4 74.0 74.5 74.7 74.8
The cross-national variations within the neo-liberal region are non-trivial, but mostly 
rather predictable and they have a lot to do with the initial conditions. Bulgaria and Romania 
 22 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 23 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 24 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 25 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 26 % total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 27 Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 28 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 29 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 30 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 31 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 32 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 33 1988
 34 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 35 Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 36 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 36 Data are from Andreja Kavar Vidmar. 2000. Social Exclusion and Poverty in Slovenia. Brussels: Observatoire 
Social Europeen.
 37 Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book.
 38 1987
 39 Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank).
 40 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
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were significantly poorer, Romania had the most repressive political system and as a result dur-
ing the early years they resembled more Russia than the Czech Republic or Poland did both in 
social, economic and political terms. Slovenia and the Czech Republic were far the most affluent 
nations. Slovenia had a double advantage: it was rather affluent during socialism and had a great 
deal of experiences with reforms and this may account for its initial success as much as for its 
cautious gradualism. The Czech Republic on the other hand did not have the reform traditions 
of Hungary and Poland, but it had a better pre-communist record in democratic governance, so 
after all the better performance of the Czech Republic was no surprise. The only slight surprise 
is the Czech “double dip” by the end of the decade, when Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are 
already on the recovery the Czech Republic slid back into a mild recession.
The differences between Hungary and Poland deserve more attention, These differences 
were not that striking during the first decade, but became more pronounced in the second phase 
of the transformation (which was the cause of so much Angst among Hungarian intellectuals 
during the past few years), but already by the late 1990s it seemed that Poland was doing some-
thing better than Hungary.
One should have anticipated Hungary to lead the pack. Hungary was the most consist-
ently on reform trajectory since the 1960s (it was the “merriest barrack in the socialist camp”, it 
implemented “goulash socialism” and more importantly was ahead of the rest in joining WTO, 
IMF, introducing monetary reforms and creating legal framework for a market economy); 
Jaruzelski tried to imitate the reforms of János Kádár41 during the 1980s with limited success in 
Poland. And in some respects Hungary remained on the cutting edges during the early years of 
post-communism. By EBRD measures Hungary was among the most aggressively liberalizing 
countries and having followed closely the Chicago School cook-book, it was rewarded for its 
eminent behaviour by being far the most attractive country for foreign investors. So in 1989-1999 
the per capita cumulative FDI-inflow into Hungary was 45% higher than in the Czech Republic 
and 3.5 times higher than in Poland (EBRD, 2000, p.74).
Nevertheless the recession in Poland lasted only for two years, in Hungary it did drag on 
for four. The recovery was also much more robust in Poland, the growth of GDP in Poland was 
5+% after 1994 for five consecutive years, Hungary experienced only one year with 5% growth 
during the whole period under consideration. According to the scarce data available to us, 
inequality and poverty grew faster in Poland than in Hungary – a big puzzle: did this happen 
despite the healthier condition of the economy or was it the reason why the Polish economy 
performed better? Most likely there are numerous reasons – not only economic, but also social, 
demographic and political - why the two countries began to diverge despite their similarities 
and are on sharply different economic growth trajectories by the second decade of the 21st cen-
tury. Those who like to blame political parties or governments for poor economic performance 
might be troubled: they may find a lot of similarities in Hungary and Poland and a big difference 
from the Czech Republic. While in the Czech Republic the democratic system was reasonably 
consolidated and the former communist parties never regained power, the far right extremist 
forces were negligible, politics in Hungary and Poland fluctuated wildly between successor par-
ties and right-wing or even extremely right-wing parties in government, each blaming the other 
for the economic problems.
So I almost randomly picked one “independent variable” to explain the differences between 
 41 János Kádár was the leader of Hungary 1956-1988 and implemented the most radical and consistent reforms 
under socialism – with the exceptions of the post 1978 Chinese reforms.
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Poland and Hungary. In Poland in 1989–1991, the finance minister Balcerowicz introduced what 
was at that time seen as brutal monetary liberalization strategy which almost instantly liberal-
ized the banking sector, implemented a new tax system and a currency reform. As a result, the 
Polish economy was in free fall, unemployment exploded by 1991, but the economy bottomed 
out within a year. On the other hand, the Poles moved with the privatization of the corporate 
sector much more cautiously, hence monetary liberalization preceded property reform.
In Hungary, the sequence of reforms was different. The Hungarian government moved 
more carefully with the monetary reform, but pushed ahead with privatization of the corporate 
sector, opening up the country to multi-national capital.  The “success” of Hungary (being so 
attractive to multinational capital and “fixing” the property right problem so early) may be the 
reason for its later “failure”. Slovenia is usually cited as the strongest case for against mass pri-
vatization and gradualism in the transformation of property relations – and it did indeed rather 
well during the first decade of the transformation (and started to have some problems during 
the last years of the second decade).
The second unanticipated cross-national difference in the neo-liberal region is the better 
performance of Slovakia than the Czech Republic. When Czechoslovakia was breaking up, 
commentators anticipated the Czech Republic to be the winner and Slovakia to join the “East”. 
Already during the first decade, the received wisdom proved to be wrong. While the economic 
recession was indeed even more severe in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, and especially 
the Slovaks did much worse in terms of unemployment than the Czechs by the second half of the 
decade, the Czech Republic slid into its second recession, but the Slovak economy took of (and 
it happened under a political regime – of Vladimir Meciar, prime minister 1994–98 – which in 
its ideology was rather neo-patrimonial). Hence, there are no easy answers what the sources of 
success or failure are. The Slovak “miracle” is certainly one of the most puzzling ones.
The Second Phase of Neo-liberal Transition (1999–2010): Take-off and Stagnation42
The second decade of neo-liberal transformation is entirely a success story: a basically un-
interrupted and rather impressive growth until the Global Financial Crisis, which hit the region 
rather bad (with the exception of Poland, the only country which sustained positive growth in 
every year during the first decade of the 21st century).
At least one qualification is needed to this rather excessively optimistic statement. During 
the first years of the second decade – well before the Global Financial Crisis hit – economic growth 
tended to be moderated, the previously prominent reduction of sovereign debt at least in some 
countries was reversed. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary began to struggle with their 
“welfare problem”. The regimes were under pressure to implement austerity measures, cut back 
the expenses on their “prematurely born welfare state”. This met political resistance, political 
mobilization, such as strikes or votes for right-wing populist parties.
During the first half of the second decade, the CEE countries constituted two different 
“camps”: countries which had stronger civil societies (and better social safety nets) - the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland - began to struggle to implement austerity measures and cut-
backs in welfare provisions – hence their growth slowed and their sovereign debt started to 
climb again. They slid into the “second transitional crisis”. While the first transitional crisis was 
the result of adjustment of the economy to market imperatives, now the second emerges as a 
 42 Data in this section are from Index Mundi (World Bank) unless indicated otherwise.
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welfare regime consistent with the logic of a market economy had to be invented. In the other 
three CEE countries either the civil society was too weak to cope with a serious challenge against 
austerity and/or the welfare provisions of the socialist epoch were too inadequate, so there was 
no particular reason to defend them.
This “second transitional crisis” was quite forceful only in Hungary (with a rather strong 
civil society with arguably the greatest stakes in exiting welfare provisions, hence the especially 
violent resistance of any cutbacks in entitlements) to produce a recession and sustained growth 
of sovereign debt already before the Global Financial Crisis. The Czechs and the Poles managed 
to dig themselves out from the downward spiral of the early years, to regain better growth rates 
and limit budget deficits. The Bulgarians, Romanians and Slovaks had a ball until the Global 
Crisis came; they were swallowing the capital which found the Czech, Hungarian and Polish 
economies as becoming far too expensive and they managed to implement cutbacks and keep 
budget deficits and sovereign debt under control.
The Global Financial Crisis hit almost all neo-liberal regimes hard (only Poland managed 
to remain in positive fields even in 2009), Romania and Hungary fared the worst, but there was 
a drop in GDP output and increase of unemployment similar to the rest of EU or the advanced 
economies of the world in the other CEE countries. Although a recovery was generally under 
way soon again in 2010-11, the region was hit by the euro-crisis, which is anticipated to slow 
the growth below 3 percent. According to EBRD estimates,43 Hungary was already in recession 
again by the middle of 2012, the Czech Republic may slide into recession and only Poland and 
Slovakia may grow for more than 2 percent.
Bulgaria
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
2.5  5.0 Na 4.8 4.3 5.3 5.5 6.3 6.2 6.0 -5.0 .2
Unemployment rate
15 17.7 Na 18 14.3 12.7 11.5 9.6 7.7 6.3 9.1 9.2
Labor force participation rate44
53 52 52 51 50 51 51 53 54 56 55 54
Population below poverty line
Na 35 12.6 13.4 14.1 Na Na Na Na 21.8 Na Na
Public debts (% of GDP)45
79 74 66 54 46 41.9 31.9 25.6 10.5 15.2 14,8 16.2
GINI
Na Na 34.3 Na 29.2 Na Na Na 28.2 Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 70.9 71.2 71.5 71.8 71.6 72.0 72.3 72.6 72.8 73.1 73.4
 43 Regional Economic Prospects in EBRD Countries of Operation: May 2012. www.ebrd.com
 44 Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 45 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
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Czech Republic
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
-.5  2.5 Na 1.5 2.9 3.7 6.1 6.1 6.6 6.0 -4.1 2.3
Unemployment rate
9 8.7 Na 9.8 9.9 10.6 8.9 8.4 6.6 5.4 8.1 7.1
Labor force participation rate46
61 60 60 60 60 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Public debts (%of GDP)47
13 18 26 29 30 33.5 25.9 29.1 26.0 26.8 34.0 40.0
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na 26.0 Na Na Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 70.9 71.2 71.5 71.8 71.6 72.0 72.3 72.6 72.8 73.1 73.4
Hungary
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
4.0  5.5 Na 3.2 2.9 3.9 4.1 3.9 1.3 .6 -6.3 1.2
Unemployment rate
10 9.4 Na 5.8 5.9 5.9 7.2 7.4 7.3 7.8 10.0 10.7
Labor force participation rate48
49 49 49 49 50 50 50 51 50 50 50 51
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 13.9
Public debts (%of GDP)49
61 54 51 54 58 58.3 58.9 68.6 67.0 68.6 78.0 79.6
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 24.7 Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 71.4 71.6 71.9 72.2 72.3 72.4 72.7 72.9 73.2 73.4 74.6
Poland
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
3.8 4.8 Na 1.3 3.7 5.6 3.4 5.8 6.6 4.8 1.7 3.8
Unemployment rate
12.0 Na Na 18.1 20.0 19.5 18.2 14.9 12.8 9.8 Na 11.8
Labor force participation rate50
56 56 56 55 55 55 55 54 54 55 55 56
Population below poverty line
Na 18.4 Na Na 17.0 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Public debts (%of GDP)51
40 37 38 42 47 49.9 47.7 49.0 43.1 45.2 46.4 53.6
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 34.2 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 73.2 73.4 73.7 73.9 74.2 74.7 75.0 75.2 75.4 75.6 75.9
 46 Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 47 % total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 48  Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 49 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 50 Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 51 % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
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Romania
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
-4.8 2.2 4.8 4.5 4.9 8.1 4.1 7.7 6.0 7.1 -7.1 -1.3
Unemployment rate
11.5 Na 9.1 8.3 7.2 6.3 5.9 6.1 4.1 4.4 7.8 8.2
Labor force participation rate52
65 65 63 58 57 57 55 56 56 56 56 56
Population below poverty line
Na 44.5 Na 28.9 Na Na 25.0 Na Na Na Na Na
Public debt (% of GDP)53
24 23 23 24 22 23.6 20.3 21.4 13.0 14.7 24.0 34.8
GINI
Na Na Na Na 28.8 Na Na Na Na 31.2 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 64.0 70.2 70.4 70.6 71.1 71.4 71.6 71.9 72.2 72.5 73.7
Slovakia
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
1.9 2.2 Na 4.0 3.9 5.3 6.1 8.3 10.4 6.4 -4.7 4.0
Unemployment rate
20.0 17.0 Na 17.2 15.2 13.1 11.7 10.2 8.4 7.7 11.4 13.5
Labor force participation rate54
60 60 61 60 61 60 60 59 59 59 59 59
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na 21.0 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Public debt (%of GDP)55
47 50 49 48 43 46.6 36.9 36.1 35.9 28.7 35.7 41.0
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na 26.0 Na Na Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 73.7 74.0 74.2 74.4 74.2 74.5 74.7 75.0 75.2 75.4 75.6
Slovenia
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
5.3 4.2 2.9 3.8 2.9 4.4 4.0 5.9 6.9 3.6 -8.0 1.4
Unemployment rate
7.4 7.2 5.7 6.3 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.0 4.8 4.4 5.9 7.3
Labor force participation rate56
58 58 58 58 57 59 59 59 60 59 59 59
Population below poverty line57
Na Na Na Na Na 12.9 Na na na 12.3 na na
Public debts (% of GDP)58
22.0 26.3 26.5 27.8 27.2 27.3 26.7 26.4 23.1 21.9 35.3 38.850
GINI
Na Na na 29.2 30.8 31.2 na na na na na na
Life expectancy at birth
75.1 75.4 75.8 76.0 76.9 77.2 77.6 78.1 78.6 78.8 79.0 79.4
 52 Data 1999–2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 53 % of total population ages 15+,  see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 54 Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 55 % of total population ages 15+,  see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 56  Data are from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook
 57  Data 2000-2001 are from General government debt, Slovenia. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 
www.stat.si/eng/indikatorji.asp?ID=28
 58   Public debt was 47.6% of the DGP on 2011, Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia
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The cross-national comparison has two important implications: 1/ Bulgaria and Romania, 
despite being late bloomers (did experience a sharper downturn than the rest during the first 
decade and their recovery also started later) during the second decade of the transition, did 
catch up at least until the Global financial Crisis and the euro-crisis, which hit this countries 
particularly hard; 2/ Hungary is the worst performer in all indicators during the second decade. 
We may call the first ten years of the 21st century a “lost decade” for Hungary, it did not only 
lag behind other neo-liberal countries in economic dynamism, but it has the most severe fiscal 
problems (far the largest sovereign debt) and high unemployment. Hungary and Slovenia seem 
to be the only neo-liberal countries in a double dip recession (unless the Czech Republic will 
follow suite) in response to the euro-crisis. Slovenia did extremely well during the first years of 
the second decade, but it was hit hard by the Global Financial Crisis and the euro-crisis. And 
while its sovereign debt is just half of the Hungarian debt, it jumped as the euro-crisis unfolded, 
so Slovenia surprisingly resembles Hungary the most in 2009–12.
The catch up of Bulgaria and Romania may not be that puzzling. When in 2000 I discussed 
the Bulgarian drawn out recession with my distinguished Bulgarian colleague, Petar Mitev, he 
insightfully remarked: “Just wait a little longer. Once Germany bought up the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland, they will buy up Romania and Bulgaria”. There was certainly a 
kernel of truth in this comment. Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU and that arguably boosted 
their economies during the second decade, although too rapid integration in the EU and increas-
ing dependence on foreign capital might be the reasons why they proved to be the most vulner-
able next to Hungary to the Global Fiscal Crisis and the euro-crisis. In addition, both Bulgaria 
and Romania hesitated between the neo-patrimonial and neo-liberal trajectories during the 
first decade of the transformation, but they were striving to join EU and had to adjust their legal 
and political system to meet EU admission criteria during the first decade of the 21st century.
The Hungarian exceptionalism is a more complicated puzzle. How did Hungary turn into 
the laggard during the second decade when during the first one only Poland performed better? 
Hungary was ahead not only of Bulgaria and Romania but also the Czech Republic by the most 
indicators and broke even with Slovakia. What happened between 1999–2010 and why is Hun-
gary shifting to the Southern periphery of the EU and could be the next in line for sovereign 
bankruptcy after Greece (or Spain)?
Political parties blame each other: the right-wing government which came to power in 2010 
blames its socialist-liberal predecessor for eight years of mismanagement and excessive growth 
of sovereign debts.59 The socialist-liberal opposition blames the right-wingers for beginning 
the “overspending” before the 2002 electoral campaign and for not building on fiscal consoli-
dation achieved during the last year of the socialist-liberal government in 2009. Government 
policies obviously matter. The miserable performance of the Hungarian economy before the 
Global Financial Crisis, 2007 and 2008 could be explained at least in part by policy mistakes of 
the socialist-liberal government. During those years, GDP stagnated in Hungary (grew by 1.3 
and .6 percent), while growth rates in the rest of the region for both years were between 6 and 
10 percent. But if the socialist government has to take some responsibility for a slow decline 
and for those two miserable years, the centre-right government which came to power in 2010 
cannot be particularly proud of the poor recovery from the Global Fiscal Crisis and the worst 
 59  In 2002 the Socialist Party formed a coalition government with the Liberal Party (SZDSZ); 2010 the centre 
right FIDESZ won two third majority in parliament and faces new elections only in 2014.
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response to the euro-crisis in the whole post-communist world (the other neo-liberal countries 
only slowed down – the Czech Republic stumbling at the borders of recession – and as we will 
see neo-patrimonial regimes were not affected at all – as least so far, October 2012 when this 
paper is written).
Thus, it may be necessary to look deeper than policy errors committed by governments. The 
only question how “deep” we want to look? János Ladányi (2012) offers an interesting long durée 
explanation for the unexpected failure of Hungary. While it is usually assumed that the reforms 
under the Kádár regime were an advantage for the transition epoch, Ladányi takes the opposite 
view. The Kádár reforms were dead-end streets, they only created what one would call a “homo 
Kadariensis”, which are even less able to adapt to the market conditions (having been socialized 
in the second economy in agriculture and in other sectors of the economy). Intriguing idea, but 1/
it does not fit well the data from the first decade of the transition, when Hungary benefitted from 
earlier reforms and Poland did so even more, but the absence of reforms punished Bulgaria and 
Romania (and to some extent the Czech Republic); 2/ Even the Socialist Party (MSZP) rejects the 
legacy of Kádár; the centre right party (FIDESZ) which formed government the second time in 
2010 seeks political identity with the pre-communist Horthy regime (and arguably implements 
similar social and economic policies). Can these political forces be “objectively” kadarist, though 
they reject “subjectively” the Kádár regime as “dictatorship”? I do not find this persuasive.
Nevertheless, I concede that ironically while Hungary might have benefitted from the 
kadarist reforms during the first decade of the transformation, these advantages – namely the 
arguably excessively open door to FDI, relatively reasonable social benefits and living standards 
- backfired during the second decade of post-communism. What are the possible reasons for 
Hungary’s exceptionally poor performance after 2006? 1/The exceptionally low labour force 
participation rate (jobs were arguably eliminated due to the Hungarian privatization practice 
and heavy dependency on FDI – see EEAG 2012. 120.); 2/ strong disappointment and even 
harsher political resistance against attacks on welfare provisions, which fuelled budget deficit 
and sovereign debt (living standards were somewhat better in the “merriest barrack”, so as the 
fire after liberalization and privatization turns against the “welfare system”, people have more 
to lose, hence their greater resistance to austerity than in the neighbouring countries); 3/ greater 
dependence on foreign trade and high levels of foreign currency loans (Hungary was initially 
more attractive to FDI, since it had a long history of reforms), which made Hungary more vul-
nerable than most neo-liberal countries to the Global Financial Crisis and the euro-crisis (see 
EEAG 2012. 115., 125).
Let me conclude with a slight digression. Hungary found itself in a debt-trap by the end of 
the first decade of the 21st century. Its sovereign debt reached 80 % of the GDP. It is close to EU 
average and better than the sovereign debt of Southern European countries, but given the poor 
labour force participation, low productivity and poor prospects for economic growth, even this 
level of debt brings Hungary close to a danger of sovereign default. In 2002 the Socialist Party won 
the elections by campaigning for a “regime change for wellbeing” (jóléti rendszerváltás). Those 
who believe that socialism had a “prematurely born welfare state” which needs to be reduced 
and which advocated austerity, can blame this program for the unfolding debt crisis. I disagree. 
After 13 years of declining living standards, the Hungarian society was ready for more attention 
to “wellbeing” and aggressive state policies to generate jobs (yes Mr. Romney and Obama: state 
creates jobs!). And it was sensible to borrow during the early years of the 21st century when credit 
was easily available and interest rates were low. The socialist governments between 2002 and 
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2010 made serious errors, but not because they wanted to improve wellbeing, but because they 
went the wrong way about doing it. The borrowed resources were foolishly spent on increasing 
real income of civil servants and pensioners (it was spent on buying votes) rather than on job 
creation. While the economy was still growing until 2006, it was not growing as fast as it could 
have and worst of all it was a growth without jobs. The 80% of sovereign debts would not be a 
major reason why Hungary is the worst performer during the early years of the third decade of 
post-communist transition, if labour force participation rate and productivity were comparable 
to the core EU countries. Hence, the cure for the Hungarian disease (and the key for sustained 
economic growth in neo-liberal post-communist economies) is a simple one: no more austerity, 
no cuts in welfare benefits but jobs, jobs, jobs. k
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